Rodman v. Rodman

FACTS:
1.  Husband brought a complaint for modification in the Probate and Family Court, seeking to terminate certain obligations to his Wife, arising under a separation agreement the parties had entered into in connection with their divorce.
2.  The divorce nisi, which entered in April 2008, incorporated and merged into that judgment the provision at issue here, obligating the Husband to pay alimony to Wife in the amount of $1,539 per week.
3.  During the pendency of the modification proceeding, the Husband filed a motion seeking immediate termination of the alimony payments on the grounds that he reached "full retirement age" as defined by the Alimony Reform Act.
4.  The motion asserted that the alimony reform act became effective March 1, 2012, and that the Husband therefore was entitled to termination of the alimony order pursuant to the retirement provision of the Alimony Reform Act, which provides that "general term alimony orders shall terminate upon the payor attaining the full retirement age."


PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
1.  A Probate and Family Court judge denied the motion and then reported the following question to the Appeals Court, "Whether or not [the Alimony Reform Act] is to be applied retroacively to judgments before March 1, 2012."
2.  The Husband appealed to the SJ for direct appellate review.

ISSUE:
1.  Whether a modification of an alimony agreement that merges with a judgment that entered prior to March 1, 2012, as compared to one that survives the judgment, is prospective in effect?

RULE:
1.  No.  Uncodified section 4(c) only applies if the durational limit exception applies.  In this case, the durational limit exception does not apply, so section 4(c) does not apply.

ANALYSIS:
1.  Husband's Argument:  The Husband presented an argument that differs somewhat from that in Chin v. Merriot.  He acknowledges that sections 4 through 6 of the uncodified transitional provisions of the alimony reform act (uncodified sections), govern the extent to which the act operates to apply prospectively or retroactively to existing alimony judgments.  He also agrees that express language in these provisions declares that the alimony reform act is, in the main, prospective.  He claims, however, that modification of an alimony agreement that merges with a judgment that entered prior to March 1, 2012, as compared to one that survives the judgment, is not retrospective but prospective in effect; he contends that this applies as well to modification based on the retirement provision.

A.  Uncodified Section 4(c):  Provides that "under no circumstances shall [the alimony reform act], provide a right to seek or receive modification of an existing alimony judgment in which the parties have agreed that their alimony judgment is not modifiable, or in which the parties have expressed their intention that their agreed alimony provisions SURVIVE the judgment and therefore are not modifiable."

B.  Chin Holding:  The second clause of uncodified section 4(c), would not permit the Husband to seek modification pursuant to the retirement provision IF his alimony agreement had SURVIVED the judgment, except in very limited circumstances (see Chin).

C. Legislative Intent:  He argues that the Legislature must therefore have intended the retirement provision to apply to MERGED alimony agreements, which are always subject to modification on a showing of a material change in circumstances.  See e.g. Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 293 (2009), quoting Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366. 368); C.P. Kindregan, M. McBrien, & P.A. Kindregan, Family Law and Practice section 90.4, at 433-434 (4th ed. 2013) ("when the alimony agreement does not survive the divorce judgment the ordinary test of material change of circumstances controls in modification actions).  Under this view, modification of pre-existing merged alimony agreements is not retroactive because parties that are always subject to modification will have anticipated potential modification based on retirement, and modification based solely on the retirement provision is thus prospective in effect.

2.  Court's Conclusion as to Husband's Argument:

A.  Interpret Statute As A Whole:  We do not accept the Husband's view of uncodified section 4(c), because it would require us to disregard the familiar principle of statutory construction under which we interpret the statute as a whole.

1.  Uncodified Section 4(a):  The first sentence of the first paragraph of uncodified section 4(a) states the Legislature's intent: "General Laws c. 208 section 49, "shall apply prospectively, such that alimony judgments entered before March 1, 2012 shall terminate only under such judgments, under a subsequent modification or as otherwise provided in this act."

2.  Uncodified Section 4(b):   The sole exception to what is in essence a bar to retroactive application of the substantive provisions of the alimony reform act is set forth in uncodified section 4(b).  That section provides that the durational limits of alimony awards under G.L. c. 208 section 49, are applicable to "existing alimony judgments that exceed the durational limits," and that payment of alimony for a period that extends beyond the statutory limits, "shall be deemed a material change of circumstances that warrant modification."  See
Chin.

3.  Uncodified Section 4(c):  The next paragraph, uncodified section 4(c), however, specifies when the exception to these durational limits does not apply.  "Under no circumstances" will the exception be available to modify "an existing alimony judgment in which the parties have agreed that their alimony judgment is not modifiable, or in which the parties have expressed their intention that their agreed alimony provisions survive the judgment and therefore are not modifiable."

4.  Uncodified Section 5:  The succeeding provision, uncodified section 5, sets forth the dates after implementation of the alimony reform act on which a payor may file a complaint for modification based solely on a claim that an "existing alimony judgment exceeds the durational limits."  These dates are staggered, and based on the length of the marriage.

B.  Interpret Uncodified Section 4(c) In Particular:  Having considered the structure and textual refinements of the alimony reform act in the context of the Legislature's declared intent, we conclude that uncodified section 4(c) provides no basis for the argument that the act precludes retroactive application only as to surviving alimony agreements.  This provision creates a single general exception to prospective application for "existing alimony judgments that exceed the durational limits under" G.L. c. 208 section 49, but imposes a condition on the durational limits exception, limiting it to prospective application.  The act states clearly that under "no circumstances" will the durational limits exception be available where there is "an existing alimony judgment in which the parties have agreed that their alimony judgment is not modifiable" or where the alimony agreement survives the judgment.  See Lalchandani v. Roddy, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 819 (2015).  The Legislature plainly intended that only a claim for modification based on durational limits may (but will not always) apply retroactively to existing alimony judgments.  (In other words, 4(c) is ONLY implicated if 4(b) applies. In this case, 4(b) does not apply, so 4(c) does not apply).

CONCLUSION:
1.  General Laws c. 208 section 4(f) does NOT apply retroactively to alimony orders in divorce judgments that entered before March 1, 2012.
2.  The matter is remanded to the Probate and Family Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.